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Abstract
This paper introduces deep habits into a sticky-price sticky-wage economy and asks
whether the countercyclical markup movements induced by deep habits is helpful for ac-
counting for the dynamic eects of monetary policy shocks. We ﬁnd that this is the case:
When allowing for deep habits, the model can account very precisely for the persistent im-
pact of monetary policy shocks on aggregate consumption and for the impact on inﬂation
that other models have hard a time explaining. In particular, the model can account both
for the price puzzle and for inﬂation persistence. We also show that the deep habits mecha-
nism and nominal rigidities are complementary: The deep habits model can account for the
dynamic eects of monetary policy shock at low to moderate levels of nominal rigidities. We
show that the results are stable over time and are not caused by monetary policy changes.
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11 Introduction
A large number of papers have studied the dynamic impact of monetary policy shocks using
vector autoregression based methods. This literature has demonstrated that monetary policy
shocks are associated with persistent eects on output and its components but also that the
dynamic eects on inﬂation are associated with two puzzles: The “inﬂation persistence puzzle”
(a slow and delayed rise in inﬂation in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock)
and the “price puzzle” (a temporary drop in the price level after an expansionary monetary
policy shock). These latter two ﬁndings are termed as puzzles because they appear contrary
to conventional monetary wisdom. This paper examines whether a model of countercyclical
markups is helpful for understanding these and other features of the dynamic eects of monetary
policy shocks. We extend a standard sticky-price sticky-wage model with goods-speciﬁc (“deep”)
habits in which ﬁrms engage in dynamic pricing even in the absence of nominal rigidities. We
ﬁnd that this model can provide a very precise account of the dynamic eects of monetary policy
shocks.
In its simplest version, the standard new Keynesian model gives rise to the “New Keynesian
Phillips” curve which relates current inﬂation to current marginal costs and to future expected
inﬂation. The purely forward looking feature of this relationship implies that it cannot account
for inﬂation persistence.1 A large number of papers have addressed this issue by introducing
features that either give rise to persistent movements in marginal costs or that introduce backward
looking features into the relationship between current inﬂation and marginal costs. Galí and
Gertler (1999) examine the impact of allowing for backward looking price setters. The presence
of such backward looking price setters introduces a lagged inﬂation term in the new Keynesian
Phillips curve and therefore helps explaining the sluggish adjustment of inﬂation to monetary
policy shocks. Fuhrer and Moore (1995) introduce a relative contracting model in which workers
care about the past real wages of other workers and show that this may help explain sluggish
inﬂation adjustments to monetary policy shocks.2 More directly, Erceg, Henderson and Levin
1This result holds in Calvo style sticky price models and in models where there are costs of changing prices.
Chari, Kehoe and McGrattan, 2000, show that the same result also holds in Taylor type staggered contracts
models.
2Holden and Driscoll (2003) challenge the results of Fuhrer and Moore (1995) on the grounds that the relative
contracting model assumes that workers care about past not current relative real wages. They show that when
2(2000) assume that nominal wages as well as prices adjust sluggishly. While these authors
do not explicitly address the inﬂation persistence puzzle, other authors have shown that the
combination of sticky prices and sticky wages may be helpful for explaining inﬂation persistence,
see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005), Rabanal and Rubio-Ramirez (2003), or Smets
and Wouters (2003). There has been less theoretical work on the price puzzle an exception being
Catelnuovo and Surico (2008) who propose a monetary model in which passive policy gives
rise to indeterminacy. When the equilibrium is indeterminate, inﬂation expectations become
very persistent and implies that a structural VAR will (wrongly) lead one to conclude that
expansionary monetary policy shocks give rise to a drop in the price level.
We focus instead upon goods market features. We study a monetary model in which it is
costly for producers to change prices and for labor unions to change nominal wages. We introduce
into this environment the deep habit mechanism proposed in Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe
(2006). The deep habits model assumes that households are subject to keeping up with the
Joneses at the level of individual goods varieties. This feature implies, in the fashion of customer
markets models, that the demand function facing producers depends on past sales. This features
leads to time variation in optimal markups for two reasons. First, variations in aggregate demand
aect the price elasticity of demand facing producers. An increase in current aggregate demand
increases the price elasticity and therefore leads producers to set lower markups. Secondly, when
setting prices today, producers need to be forward looking and a producer that expects high future
demand will have an incentive to lower prices today in order to attract more future demand. In
this sense, this model gives rise to a countercyclical markup. In other papers we have shown that
this mechanism is helpful for understanding the impact of technology shocks and of government
spending shocks (see Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe, 2006, 2008). The countercyclicality of the
markup is the key reason why the deep habits model may be an interesting model in which to
consider the dynamic eects of monetary policy.
In order to evaluate this issue we ﬁrst estimate a VAR on post-war U.S. data and derive
the impact of a monetary policy shock using standard identifying assumptions. We study a
low-dimensional VAR that consists of aggregate consumption, the CPI inﬂation rate, the federal
funds rate, and the commodity price index. We include the commodity price index in the VAR
workers care about other workers’ current real wages, the model has no inﬂation persistence in the sense that the
Phillips curve is entirely forward looking.
3in order not to bias our results towards the existence of a price puzzle.3 Monetary policy shocks
are identiﬁed assuming that a monetary policy shock has no within-quarter impact on output
and inﬂation, a standard assumption in this literature. The VAR measurement of the dynamic
eects of a monetary policy shock conforms with the conventional wisdom regarding inﬂation
persistence and the price puzzle. We ﬁnd that the price level drops for 2 quarters after an
expansionary monetary policy shock and that the maximum increase in inﬂation appears as late
as 3 years after the initial expansion of monetary policy. These results are completely in line
with results from much higher dimensional VARs, see e.g. Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans
(2005). We also ﬁnd that aggregate consumption increases persistently and in a hump-shaped
manner in response to an expansionary monetary policy shock.
We estimate key parameters of the model using a limited information approach and compare
the results to two alternative economies. The ﬁrst alternative economy replaces the deep habits
mechanism with a standard aggregate habit model. The second alternative economy corresponds
to the standard new Keynesian model that abstracts from habits. We ﬁnd that the model with
deep habits provides a superior ﬁt to the identiﬁed dynamic eects of monetary policy shocks. In
particular, this model can account simultaneously for the persistent impact of monetary policy
shocks on consumption, for the price puzzle, and for inﬂation persistence. Moreover, the estimates
of the extent of nominal rigidities are signiﬁcantly lower in the deep habits economy than in the
economy with aggregate habits. The standard aggregate habit model in contrast can account
for neither the price puzzle nor fully for inﬂation persistence. The model without any habits can
account for the price puzzle but only by relying on absurd implications for the extent of price
rigidity and odd monetary policy reaction functions.
We show that the key reason for the ability of the deep habits model to account for the
impact of monetary policy shocks is due to a complementarity between nominal rigidities and the
customer markets feature of the model. In response to an expansionary monetary policy shock,
the presence of nominal rigidities implies that aggregate consumption increases. In the deep
habits economy the increase in consumption gives producers an incentive to lower the markup.
3A common argument is that the price puzzle is an expression of misspeciﬁcation of VAR models in the sense
that it is important to include variables that are forward looking reﬂecting that central banks target future
inﬂation. Following Sims (1992) much of the literature has addressed this point by augmenting VARs with the
commodity price index. In our VAR, as well as in higher dimensional VARs, see e.g.Christiano, Eichenbaum and
Evans, 2005, the price puzzle remains but is weaker than when commodity prices are excluded.
4This by itself gives rise to a smaller inﬂation impact of an expansionary monetary policy shock
in the deep habits economy than in models that assume either no habits or habits that operate
at the level of aggregate consumption. When the deep habit eect is su!ciently strong, the deep
habits model generates a fall in inﬂation on impact after an expansionary monetary policy shock.
As the consumption boom dies out, producers slowly increase prices and this implies that the
model also can account for inﬂation persistence.
Our results show that a simple structural model that combines nominal rigidities with deep
habits is able to account for the impact of monetary policy shocks. Parts of the literature,
however, has claimed that the inﬂation persistence puzzle is not “structural” but is caused by
changes in monetary policy and to instability of the inﬂation process. It has been pointed out
that inﬂation persistence appears to be sensitive to the monetary policy regime (see e.g. Benati,
2008), and that there appears to have been breaks in the inﬂation process which renders inﬂation
less persistent when controlled for (see e.g. Levin and Piger, 2003). For that reason we repeat our
analysis for two sub-samples breaking the data in the third quarter of 1979 when Volcker became
the chairman of the Fed. Consistently with earlier results in the literature, we ﬁnd that the
earlier sub-sample is associated with more pronounced price and inﬂation puzzles than the late
sample. Both of these puzzles, however, still hold true in the VAR reestimated using data for the
late sample only. We then reestimate the structural parameters and ﬁnd that monetary policy
has become less accommodating over time, that price rigidity has increased while wage rigidity
has declined, but the extent and importance of deep habits have remained roughly constant.
Therefore, we conclude that the customer markets feature of our model appears to be key for
understanding the dynamic impact of monetary policy.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the model. In Section
3 we describe our estimation approach and discuss the impact of monetary policy shocks in the
U.S. Section 4 analyses the results. Finally we conclude in Section 5.
2 The Model
We consider an economy with monopolistically competitive ﬁrms that are subject to costs of
changing nominal prices. We also allow for sticky nominal wages assuming that households act
as monopolistically competitive suppliers of labor but that it is costly to change nominal wages.
The key contribution of the paper is that we introduce is a customer markets feature on the
5demand side of the economy. We adopt the deep habits model of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and
Uribe (2006) which assumes that households form habits to individual goods varieties. This
habit model implies that ﬁrms face dynamic pricing problems and will set non-constant markups
in response to shocks to the economy even in the absence of any nominal rigidities. It is the
implied dynamics of markups that makes this an interesting model in which to study the dynamic
eects of monetary policy.
2.1 Households
There is a continuum of households indexed by m 5 [0>1]. Households are identical, inﬁnitely lived,
and maximize the expected present discounted value of their utility stream. They derive utility
from consumption of a continuum of dierentiated goods and have dis-utility of supplying labor.
As in Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), households are assumed to supply a dierentiated
labor input and act as monopolistically competitive labor unions in the labor market. They also
face costs of changing nominal wages. Households own ﬁrms and receive dividend payments on
their equity shares.
We deviate from the standard constant elasticity of substitution modeling of preferences that
is common in the literature. We assume instead that households are subject to good-speciﬁc
habits and adopt the external deep habits model of Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006).
This model assumes that the marginal utility derived from the consumption of individual goods
varieties is subject to a consumption externality that we specify as a catching up with the Joneses
feature. Thus, the important extension is that the habits operate at the level of marginal utility
of individual goods varieties rather than at the level of the consumption basket.
Household m consumes a basket of goods, f
m
lw, l 5 [0>1] and supplies labor to the ﬁrms.














































where Hw denotes the mathematical expectations operator contingent on all information available
at date w,  5 (0>1) is the subjective discount factor,  is a curvature parameter, 1@ A 0 is the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply, A0 is a preference weight, k
m
w denotes the household m’s labor
supply in period w,a n d{
m
w is the deﬁnition of the consumption basket from which the household
derives utility. This latter variable is deﬁned in equation (2).
The household derives utility from a CES-aggregate of “habit adjusted” consumption levels
of each of the continuum of dierentiated goods. We model the habit relating to the consumption
of variety l as the past aggregate consumption of this variety.5 The household is assumed to
take flw, the aggregate consumption of good l, as exogenously given. The parameter 0  
g ?
1 measures the importance of the habit. When 
g =0 , preferences are separable over time
and the consumption aggregator is a standard CES function. In this case, A0 denotes the
standard intratemporal elasticity of substitution between goods. When 
g A 0, preferences
display “catching up with the Joneses” at the goods level.6 As we will return to below, this
formulation of the habit introduces a key supply-side channel through which habits aect price
setting.














4Implicitly, households also derive utility from real money balances and we assume that the utility function
is separable in money and its other arguments. Because we later specify a monetary policy reaction function in
terms of an interest rate rule, we do not explicitly need to look at the demand for money.
5It is straightforward to allow for persistence in the habit by introducing a habit stock. Here we adopt the
simpler formulation to keep the analysis more focused.
6Ravn, Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe (2006) also deal with the case of internal habits in which the household’s cur-
rent marginal utility of consumption of variety l depends on its own past consumption of that variety. Nakamura















where Slw denotes the nominal price of variety l.





















According to the demand function (4), the household’s demand for each goods variety depends
negatively on its relative price, Slw@Sw,a n dw h e n
g A 0 current demand also depends positively
on the habit stock of the goods variety in question.
Households act as monopolistically competitive labor unions in the labor market. In return
for their market power, they must stand ready to satisfy any demand for their labor services at













w denotes the nominal wage of household m’s labor good, Zw is an aggregate wage, #A1
is the labor demand price elasticity, and kw is a measure of aggregate labor demand. Individual
households take Zw and kw for given.
The household makes its choices subject to the following sequence of budget constraints:
Sw{
m




























and subject to a no-Ponzi game restriction.
Our formulation of the household budget constraint assumes that the household has access to
a nominal risk free bond which allows it to spread consumption expenditure (and labor supply)
over time. E
m
w denotes the household’s purchases of one-period nominal bonds, Uw denotes the
gross nominal interest rate and x
m
w is the household’s receipts of dividend payments on its equity
portfolio.7












8T h el a s tt e r mo nt h er i g h th a n ds i d eo ft h eb u d g e tc o n s t r a i n td e n o t e sn o m i n a lc o s t so f
adjusting nominal wages. The parameter z  0 parametrizes the extent of nominal wage
rigidity. When z =0 , nominal wages are ﬂexible while z A 0 implies that households incur
a nominal cost of changing wages which is quadratic in the deviation of nominal wage growth
from an indexation factor e zw. We assume that this latter variable is given as:
e zw = &z
W
z +( 1 &z)zw31
where &z 5 [0>1) is a measure the extent of indexation of nominal wages. When &z =1
households can costlessly increase wages with the steady-state wage inﬂation rate (W
z) while
&z =0implies that wages are fully indexed to the realized past inﬂation rate of aggregate
nominal wages, zw31 = Zw31@Zw32.
The household’s labor supply, the nominal wage, and its intertemporal allocation of {
m
w can
be found as the solutions to the maximization of (1) subject to (6)  (7) taking as given Sw, &w,
Z
m
0, Uw,a n dx
m






























































































m>w is the multiplier on the labor demand function in equation (6).
We note from (8)  (10) that the labor supply decision and the intertemporal consumption
allocation depends on the presence of habits in the consumption aggregator. According to (8),
the household’s labor supply is increasing in the real wage. Equation (9) is a forward looking
“wage setting curve”. When wages are ﬂexible (z =0 ) ,e q u a t i o n s(8)  (9) imply that the
household sets the real wage as a ﬁxed markup over the marginal rate of substitution between
labor and consumption. This markup is given as #@(#  1)  1.8 In the presence of nominal
wage stickiness, the household sets a forward looking nominal wage. Finally, equation (10) is
the intertemporal Euler equation which implies that the (habit adjusted) consumption proﬁle
8Given that our focus is not upon optimal monetary policy issues, we choose not to neutralize the steady-state
monopoly power by a labor supply subsidy. This has no impact on our results.
9is increasing in the expected real interest rate. It is important to notice that the impact of
deep habits on the household’s intertemporal allocation and on labor supply is equivalent to the
impact of assuming aggregate habits.
2.2 Firms
Firms are assumed to be monopolistically competitive. They produce output using inputs of
labor and we assume that the production function is linear:
|lw = klw (11)













lw is ﬁrm l’s input of labor variety m at date w. The ﬁrm purchases the labor varieties at
the nominal price Z
m



















Aggregating (12) across ﬁrms gives (6).




















Thus, the demand function facing ﬁrm l inherits the properties of the individual demand
function. Importantly, the demand facing ﬁrm l at date w d e p e n d sb o t ho nt h ev a r i e t y ’ sr e l a t i v e
price and on the ﬁrm’s past sales of its product. This latter feature of the demand function
implies that ﬁrms face dynamic pricing problems even in the absence of nominal rigidities, a
feature that is shared by other customer markets models. As analyzed in detail in our previous
10work, the preference model assumed here implies that ﬁrms have an incentive to lower prices
today if they expect future demand (i.e. {
m
w)t ob eh i g hr e l a t i v et oc u r r e n td e m a n d . 9 Moreover,
an increase in current demand, {w,o v e rh a b i t u a ld e m a n d( flw31), increases the price elasticity of
the demand facing the ﬁrm since it increases the weight on the price elastic term in the demand
function in equation (13). This increase in the price elasticity give ﬁrms an incentive to lower
prices. For these reasons, this model provides new channels through which monetary policy
shocks may aect the economy relative to standard models that assume CES-utility structures.
Firm l sets the price of its product, Slw, subject to the household demand functions taking as
given all aggregate quantities and prices. In return for having market power, ﬁrms must stand
ready to serve any demand at the announced prices, i.e. flw  |lw. As in the case of households, we
assume that it is costly for ﬁrms to change prices. Following Rotemberg (1982), we assume that
there are quadratic adjustment costs associated with changing nominal prices. Firms therefore

















subject to (13) taking as given tw, Sl0, Sw, Zw, {w and e w. xlw denotes the nominal proﬁts of ﬁrm l
in period w and tw is the rate at which the ﬁrm’s owners, i.e. the households, discount the stream







The parameter   0 parametrizes the extent of nominal rigidities. When  $ 0 prices are
ﬂexible and the model exhibits super neutrality in the short and long run run. Positive values
of  implies that ﬁrms have an incentive to smooth price changes over time. Symmetrically to
wage setting, we allow for the possibility of indexation through the term e w which is assumed to
9Notice from the demand function that there is a price insensitive term that derives from past sales. One
might be tempted to conclude that the ﬁrm can set a price of inﬁnity making inﬁnite proﬁts due to this term.
However, in equilibrium such a policy will not be consistent with household budget constraints and can therefore
be ruled out.
10This equation imposes homogeneity across households, an assumption that we impose below.
11be given as:
e w = &s
W +( 1 &s)w31
where W is the steady state inﬂation rate and w31 = Sw31@Sw32 is the lagged realized aggregate
inﬂation rate. When &s =1t h i ss p e c i ﬁ c a t i o ni m p l i e st h a tt h e r ea r en oa d j u s t m e n tc o s t sa l o n g
ab a l a n c e dg r o w t hp a t hw i t hc o n s t a n ti n ﬂ a t i o n .W h e n&s =0 , there is full indexation.











































w is the multiplier on the production function (11), i.e. marginal costs, and 
f
w is the
multiplier on the demand function in (13).









,e q u a t i o n s(17)  (18),
imply that prices are set as ﬁxed mark-up over nominal marginal costs. When there are nominal
rigidities and/or preferences display deep habits, the markup will be time-varying in response to
shocks to the economy. It is instructive to consider the two special cases when either prices are
ﬂexible or there are no deep habits. In these special cases, equations (17)(18) can be expressed
as:

















































According to the ﬁrst expression, when there are deep habits, ﬁrms will vary the markup
in response to changes in current aggregate demand in response to expected changes in future
consumption growth. An increase in current demand or in the expectations about future demand
for the variety give ﬁrms an incentive to lower the current markup. The second of these equations
is standard in sticky price models and implies that ﬁrms smooth price increases over time in
response to changes in marginal costs or in aggregate demand.
122.3 Monetary Policy
We assume that the monetary policy authority sets the monetary stance according to a simple
interest rate rule:
Uw = U
W + U (Uw31  U
W)+( 1 Q)








where %w is a stochastic “monetary policy shock” with variance  2. UW, W and |W are positive
constants which denote the steady state levels of the nominal interest rate, inﬂation and output,
respectively. The parameter U 5 [0>1) denotes the extent of interest rate smoothing.
2.4 Market Clearing
















We concentrate upon a symmetric equilibrium in which all consumers make the same choice over
consumption and set the same wage, and in which all ﬁrms set the same prices. The symmetric
13equilibrium is summarized by the following set of equations:
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w+1 (w+1  e w+1) (27)
Uw  U
W = U (Uw31  U








e w = &s
W +( 1 &s)w31 (29)
e zw = &z
W
z +( 1 &z)zw31 (30)
zw = zw31 + zw  w (31)
where zw denotes the real wage, zw is the wage inﬂation rate, and w is the price inﬂation rate.
We solve for the equilibrium by log-linearizing this system of equations around the steady-state.
It is instructive to consider the implications for inﬂation dynamics on the basis of the log-




1+ (1  &s)
b w31 +

1+ (1  &s)
Hwb w+1
+#1c pfw  #2
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w h e r ew el e tb {w denote the percentage deviation of {w from its steady-state value, and pfw denotes





































(1 +  (1  &s))
¶
14where { denotes the steady-state value of {.
In the absence of deep habits and when prices are not indexed (
g =1 &s =0 ), equation
(32) generates the standard new Keynesian Phillips curve. Indexation introduces a backward
looking inﬂation term which implies a more persistent response to shocks to marginal costs. The
presence of deep habits moderates the Phillips curve in three important ways. First, the habit
increases the impact of marginal cost changes on inﬂation. Secondly, the deep habit introduces
a backward looking term in the Phillips curve even in the absence of indexation through the
impact of the habit stock on this period’s demand. Third, the presence of habits introduces an




In this section we provide empirical evidence on the dynamic eects of a monetary policy shock.
We then estimate key parameters of the model presented in the preceding section and evaluate its
ability to account for the empirically estimated impact of a monetary policy shock. We estimate
the structural parameters by matching the empirical estimates of the impact of a monetary policy
shock in the U.S. taking into account that the identifying assumptions made when estimating
t h em o n e t a r yp o l i c ys h o c km a yi m p a c to nt h em e a s u r e m e n t .
3.1 SVAR Estimates of the Impact of Monetary Policy Shocks
We study U.S. quarterly data for the sample period 1954:2 - 2008:2. The dynamic impact of a
monetary policy shock are estimated using a standard structural VAR estimator. Consider the
following reduced form VAR:
{w = E (O){w31 + hw (33)
where {w is a vector of observables, E (O) is a lag-polynomial, and hw is a vector of reduced form




where fw denotes the logarithm of per capita consumption, w is the inﬂation rate, sv
w is the
logarithm of the commodity price index divided by the CPI, and uw is the federal funds rate. We
measure consumption as personal consumption expenditure in chained year 2000 prices divided
15by the civilian non-institutional population. Inﬂation is measured as the change in CPI (of all
urban consumers). The commodity price index is the PPI of commodities. All variables are
de-seasonalized.
We include consumption rather than output in the VAR because our model excludes invest-
m e n ta n df o rt h es a m er e a s o nw em e a s u r ei n ﬂ a t i o no nt h eb a s i so ft h eC P Ir a t h e rt h a nt h eG D P
deﬂator. The commodity price index is included in order to partially address the price puzzle.
The small dimension of the VAR relative to other recent papers, see e.g. Christiano, Eichen-
baum, and Evans (2005), is due to the fact that our model is focused entirely on the impact of
monetary policy shocks on consumption and inﬂation.
The monetary policy shock is identiﬁed using standard timing assumptions. We assume that
the interest rate is aected contemporaneously by shocks to the ﬁrst three components of the
VAR but that none of these variables respond contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock.




Ds{w3s + %w (34)
where Dl, l =0 >==>s, are square matrices and %w is the vector structural innovations with the
restriction that its covariance matrix is diagonal. The last component of this vector is the
monetary policy shock and it is identiﬁed by assuming that the last column of D0 consists of
zeros apart from its last element (which is normalized to unity).
The impulse responses to the identiﬁed monetary policy shock are illustrated in Figure 1. The
estimations allow for constant terms and trends in the empirical VAR and we estimated the VAR
allowing for 8 lags (but shorter lag structures give almost identical results). We show the impact
of a one standard error decline in the federal funds rate (i.e. an expansionary monetary policy
shock) along with 95 percent (bootstrapped, non-centered) conﬁdence intervals for a forecast
horizon of 20 quarters.
The monetary policy shock itself corresponds to a persistent decline in the nominal interest
rate which remains low for around 6 quarters before eventually returning to its long-run value.
The monetary policy loosening gives rise to a hump-shaped and persistent increase in aggregate
consumption which peaks at 4 percent above trend around 6 quarters after the monetary policy
shock. The increase in consumption persists until approximately 3.5 years after the decline in
the interest rate.
The response of inﬂation conﬁrms conventional wisdom. We ﬁnd that the inﬂation response
16is negative for the ﬁrst 2 quarters after the expansionary monetary policy shock (recall that the
impact response is by deﬁnition equal to zero). Inﬂation only starts increasing around a year and
a half after the decline in the interest rate and it then rises very persistently. The peak response
occurs as long as 3 years after monetary policy shock. Thus, the low-scale VAR conﬁrms the
presence of the price puzzle and the inﬂation persistence puzzle.
3.2 Estimation of the Structural Parameters
The model introduces quite a large number of parameters some of which we have little idea about
realistic values. For that reason we will estimate structural parameters. We do this by matching
the impulse responses identiﬁed above.
Let the vector of parameters be given by X. We partition this vector into two subsets, X1
and X2. X1 consists of parameters that we will calibrate rather than estimate formally. We make
this distinction between the structural parameters because not all of them are easily identiﬁable
from our estimation approach since they may have little eect on the dynamics of the model but
instead matter for the steady state. Moreover, for some of the parameters there are good grounds
for calibration. The vector of parameters that we calibrate consists of X1 =[ >W>>>>#] while
the parameters that are estimated formally are X2 =
£
>s>& s>z>& z>
g> U> |> > 
¤
.
3.2.1 Calibration of X1
The calibration of the parameters in X1 is summarized in Table 1. We calibrate  so that it
implies a 4 percent annual real interest rate in the non-stochastic steady-state. W is normalized
to 111 while  is calibrated so that it is consistent with a steady-state level of hours work equal
to thirty percent.
Ideally, we would like to estimate the parameters > > and #. However, we found that these
parameters are not well-identiﬁed from the data. Following Erceg et al (2000), we set # =4 .T h i s
implies that the real wage is set as a 33 percent markup over the marginal rate of substitution
between consumption and leisure. We set  =0 =5. This is a custom value in the macro literature
but implies a higher labor supply elasticity that commonly estimated in the micro literature.
Nevertheless, given the simplicity of our model, we adopt the lower value of  used in the macro
11The value of  has no impact on the impulse responses and is therefore calibrated.
17literature. Finally, we set  =3which implies an intertemporal elasticity of substitution of
consumption of 1/3 which is in the range of values that is viewed as “reasonable”.
3.2.2 Estimation of X2
We estimate X2 using a limited information approach. The idea of the estimation is to derive
X2 by matching the model based impact of a monetary policy shock with the empirical VAR
estimates.
We do this the following way. First, collect the empirical estimates of the responses of
consumption, inﬂation, and the nominal interest rate to a one standard error monetary policy
shock in the 3U{1 vector b xgdwd and let Z be a 3U square diagonal matrix with the inverse of the
standard errors of b xgdwd along its diagonal. The structural parameters are then estimated from
the following minimization problem:















wkhru| denotes the impulse response of the observables in the model economy
given the parameters that are estimated, X2, contingent upon our calibration of X1.
When estimating X2 we need to take into account one subtle issue. Recall that when esti-
mating b xgdwd we assumed that consumption and inﬂation do not respond contemporaneously to
the monetary policy shock. In our model this identifying assumption is not correct. To address
this problem we introduce a simulation step in which we measure the model’s impulse responses
subject to the empirical identiﬁcation strategy.12 Thus, b x(X2|X1)
wkhru| does not correspond di-
rectly to the “true” responses of the observables to the monetary policy in the model economy,
b u ti n s t e a dt ot h ei m p a c to fameasured monetary policy shock on the model equivalents of
the observables. That is, we derive the measure b x(X2|X1)
wkhru| using the following strategy:
Step 1: Solve the model for a given value of X2 and for the assumed value of X1.
Step 2: Simulate Q times time series of length W of the observables given X. Let the observ-
ables be consumption, inﬂation and the nominal interest rate. Add a small amount of
measurement error to each of the artiﬁcial time series.
12Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2005) address this issue instead by introducing timing assumptions in
the model economy that renders it consistent with the identifying assumption in the data.
18Step 3: Estimate a VAR for each of the Q artiﬁcial time series and calculate b xl (X2|X1)
wkhru|
of the l’th simulation from the impulse responses assuming that consumption and inﬂation
do not respond contemporaneously to the monetary policy shock.
Step 4: Calculate b x(X2|X1)
wkhru| as the mean of b xl (X2|X1)
wkhru| for l =1 >2>==Q.
The measurement errors are added in step 2 in order to address the stochastic singularity
of the VAR using the artiﬁcial data given that there is a single source of variation in the time




























where Pl is the covariance matrix of b xl (X2|X1)
wkhru| and P is the covariance matrix of the impulse
responses in the data.
This estimator is applied subject to various parameter restrictions. We assume that s>z> |> 
0, 0  &s>& z  1, ,  A 1, 0  
g ? 1,a n d1 ? Q ? 1. We use 100 simulations in step
3 and the (vector of) measurement error added in step 2 is assumed to be normally distributed
with mean 0 and variance 0.0001.
4R e s u l t s
In this section we discuss the estimation results and the extent to which the deep habits model
is useful for understanding the impact of monetary policy shocks. In order to bring out the
insights clearer we compare the results for the deep habits model with two alternative models.
The ﬁrst alternative model is a standard “aggregate” habit new Keynesian model. In this model












































19which is the speciﬁcation used in much of the literature. 
d here denotes the importance of the
aggregate (external) habit. A crucial dierence between this model and the deep habits model is
that the aggregate habit does not impact directly on ﬁrms’ pricing policies and leaves markups
constant unless there are impediments to changing prices. The second alternative model is the
standard new Keynesian model with no habits which corresponds to our baseline model with the
restriction that 
g =0 . The estimates of the parameters and their standard errors of the deep
habits model and the parameters of the two alternative models are reported in Table 2.
It is instructive ﬁrst to consult Figures 2-4 which illustrate the VAR based impulse responses
of the observables to a monetary policy shock for the three alternative models along with the
empirical counterparts of these responses. Even a visual inspection makes it clear that the deep
habits model provides a superior ﬁt to the empirical estimates of the impact of a monetary policy
shock. The deep habits model captures very precisely the hump-shaped impact of the monetary
policy shock on aggregate consumption and the interest rate path is also matched extremely
well. Importantly, the ﬁt to the impact on inﬂation is extremely good: The model can account
simultaneously for the price puzzle and for inﬂation persistence. As far as the latter phenomenon
is concerned, the model not only is consistent with an outdrawn increase in inﬂation but it also
correctly identiﬁes the period of maximum impact on the inﬂation rate.
The aggregate habit model gives rise to a consumption response to the monetary policy
shock that is very similar to the deep habits model. The reason for this is that the deep habits
and aggregate habits model imply identical Euler equations for the intertemporal allocation of
aggregate consumption. However, the aggregate habits model provides a worse ﬁt to both the
interest rate path and to the inﬂation response. As far as the interest rate path is concerned,
the initial size of the shock appears to be under-estimated. In terms of the inﬂation response,
the aggregate habits model can account neither for the price puzzle nor for the extent of the
inﬂation persistence since the maximum impact on inﬂation occurs around a year earlier in the
model than in the US data.
By far the worst ﬁt occurs in the standard new Keynesian model in which the interest rate
path is rather odd, and the consumption response is very dierent from what is observed in the
data. The model does appear to be consistent with the main features of the inﬂation response
but this is due to the rather odd interest rate path and comes at the cost of the poor ﬁt to the
consumption dynamics.
The impression of the superior ﬁt of the deep habits model is conﬁrmed by the minimized
20value of the quadratic form reported in the last row of Table 2. The deep habits model attains
a minimum of the quadratic form that is 40 percent lower than the aggregate habits model and
70 percent lower than the standard new Keynesian model. The parameters estimated with the
standard new Keynesian model are rather absurd. In particular, this model implies an extremely
high cost of changing nominal prices while the estimate of the nominal wage rigidity is moderate.
The former of these ﬁndings echo results in Ireland (2001). For that reason, we concentrate the
discussion on two habit formation models.
The point estimate of the key deep habits parameter, 
g,i s0=852. Interestingly, when we
instead assume a standard aggregate habit model, we ﬁnd a very similar point estimate of the
aggregate habit parameter, 
d =0 =826. The associated standard errors are in both cases very
small. Thus, the two models have very similar implications for how habits aect the intertemporal
allocation of consumption but as we have seen lead to very dierent implications for the dynamics
of inﬂation.
The most interesting parameters apart from those relating to habits, are those that relate to
the extent of nominal rigidities. The estimates of s and z a r em u c hl o w e ri nt h ed e e ph a b i t s
economy relative to the aggregate habit model. When we allow for deep habits we ﬁnd that
s =1 4 =5 and that z =4 1 . In the aggregate habits economy instead we ﬁnd more than twice as
high estimates of both parameters, s =3 1and z =1 0 3 . Thus, not only does the deep habits
model account better for the dynamic adjustment of prices in response to a monetary policy
shock, but it does so relying on smaller impediments to price and wage adjustment. Notice also
that both of the habit models gives estimates of &s that imply full indexation of prices while the
models disagree on the extent of wage indexation.
The monetary policy function parameter estimates imply a great deal of interest rate smooth-
ing with a point estimate of U of 0.74 in the deep habits economy and 0.85 when assuming
aggregate habits. However, the relative weight on inﬂation varies quite substantially across the
two models with the deep habits model being consistent with a more hard nosed anti-inﬂationary
central bank reaction function.
Recall that the impulse responses illustrated in Figures 2-4 do not correspond directly to the
impact of a monetary policy shock in the model since they are measured subject to the VAR
ﬁlter. In order better to understand the results, we now examine the exact impulse responses of
the two habits models. These are illustrated in Figure 5 and 6. The exact impulse responses for
the aggregate habits model conﬁrm the lack of a good ﬁt to the inﬂation process. In fact, in this
21model the inﬂation rate rises slightly upon impact and reaches its peak two years after the cut
in the interest rate. Moreover, the consumption response is much more muted according to the
exact impulse responses than the VAR-based impulse responses. The deep habits model instead
paints a dierent picture. For this model the consumption and interest rate paths according to
the VAR-based measurement are as good as identical to the exact impulse responses. The exact
impulse responses of the inﬂation dynamics instead indicate an even larger price puzzle than the
VAR based results. This is interesting since it implies that the price puzzle does not seem to be
caused by measurement.
The adjustment of markups is the key dierence between the two habit models. To see better
the impact of introducing deep habits, Figure 7 illustrates the paths of the markup in response to
a monetary policy shock. We plot three markup paths. The ﬁrst two correspond to the responses
of markups in the deep habits and aggregate habits economies using the parameter estimates
reported in Table 2. The third path corresponds to the impulse response of the markup using
the parameter estimates of the deep habits economy (the ﬁrst column of Table 2) but setting 
d
equal to the corresponding estimate for the deep habit and setting the deep habits parameter
to zero. Comparing the ﬁrst and third paths of the markup thus tells us the impact of allowing
for deep habits rather than the standard aggregate habit assuming that all other parameters are
unchanged.
Comparing the paths of the markup when assuming common parameters so that the two
economies dier only in the modeling of habits illustrates that the deep habits mechanism gives
rise to a much steeper decline in the markup in response to the monetary policy shock than
the standard aggregate habit model. The reason for this is that the producers in the deep habit
economy ﬁnd it optimal to lower the markup in response to the increase in current demand (which
increases the price elasticity of demand) and the expectation of future consumption growth (which
makes future market share valuable) that take place following the decline in the interest rate.
This leads to a period of declining inﬂation despite the monetary injection. As time goes by,
current consumption and habitual consumption become aligned and future consumption growth
declines. This reverses producers’ incentive to lower the markup and at this point prices start
rising rather fast. This mechanism brings about a persistent increase in the inﬂation rate which
matches the response of inﬂation observed in the US data.
Recall that the estimates of the costs of changing prices and wages are lower when we allow
for deep habits than in the standard aggregate habit economy (see Table 2). Despite this, the
22markup declines more in the deep habits economy than in the aggregate habit economy when
we allow for dierences in parameter values. This shows that the deep habits mechanism and
nominal rigidities are complementary in terms of giving rise to a prolonged period of low markups
after the monetary policy shock. The presence of nominal rigidities thus creates a role for deep
habits in accounting for the dynamic impact of monetary policy shocks while the introduction
of deep habits implies less need for extreme degrees of impediments to the adjustment of prices
and wages.
4.1 Constrained Markup
One worry with the results discussed above is that the markup in the deep habits model may be
somewhat large and is far too small in the standard new Keynesian model. In the deep habits

















while in the two alternative models the steady-state markup is

31. Thus, given the point esti-
mates in Table 2, the steady-state markup in the standard new Keynesian model is approximately
0, it is 24 percent in the standard habit model, while it is as high as 74 percent in the deep habits
model.
In Table 3 we report the parameter estimates when we constrain the markup to be 50 percent.
In the deep habits economy we introduce this restriction by allowing 
g to be estimated and then
imposing the value of  that is consistent with a 50 percent markup. In the other two economies
we instead impose  =3directly.
Introducing this restriction leads to much more reasonable estimates of the degree of nominal
rigidities for the standard new Keynesian model but its ﬁt is still much worse than any of the two
alternative models. The parameters of the two habit economies are to a large extent unchanged.
In particular, the estimates of 
g and 
d are very similar to those reported in Table 2 and still
indicate signiﬁcant habit eects. We ﬁnd a slight drop in the estimate of the extent of nominal
rigidities in the deep habits economy but the parameters now appear more precisely estimated.
In the aggregate habits economy instead, the estimate of s f a l l sb u tw eo b t a i na ne v e nh i g h e r
estimate of z. Most importantly, according to the quadratic form, the deep habits model still
provides a much better ﬁt to the data than the standard habit model.
23Figure 8 illustrates the VAR based impulse responses for the constrained version of the deep
habits model. We note that the results are approximately unchanged relative to those shown in
Figure 3. Thus, our results do not derive from unreasonable assumptions regarding the markup.
4.2 Sub-Sample Stability
During the sample period US monetary policy has undergone fundamental changes. These
changes have elsewhere been shown to have given rise to important changes in the monetary
reaction function and it has also been claimed that these structural changes are partially respon-
sible for price puzzle and for the extent of the inﬂation puzzle. Therefore, it is potentially an
important issue to take into account as far as the current exercise is concerned.
Perhaps the most fundamental change in US monetary policy took place in August 1979
when Volcker took o!ce at the Federal Reserve. His chairmanship marked the beginning of a
less accommodating US monetary policy regime which has been associated with a decline in the
US inﬂation rate. For this reason we now examine the consequences of allowing for a structural
change that takes place in the third quarter of 1979. To be precise, we reestimate the empirical
VAR by splitting the sample into a pre-1979:3 sample and a post-1979:2 sample. We then re-
estimate the structural parameters and examine the extent to which the change in monetary
policy aects our results.
The parameter estimates relating to the sub-samples are reported in Table 4. The key message
from this table is that although we ﬁnd changes in some parameters, the estimates of the deep
habits parameter are constant across sub-samples and very similar to the full sample results.
Parameter instability relates instead mainly to (a) the parameters relating to the monetary
policy reaction function, and (b) the parameters that determine the extent of nominal rigidities.
As far as the interest rate rule is concerned, the late sub-sample is associated with a hard nosed
interest rate rule which depends on inﬂation only while the early sample was characterized by
accommodating monetary policy with a large weight associated with ﬂuctuations in output. We
also ﬁnd some decline in the extent of interest rate smoothing. In terms of nominal rigidities we
ﬁnd that the extent of rigidity of prices has increased over time while wages have become more
ﬂexible. These results square well with conventional wisdom.
Figure 9 shows the impact of a monetary policy shock in the late sub-sample. We ﬁnd a
smaller price puzzle and a less persistent impact of monetary policy shocks on the inﬂation rate
24in recent sub-sample relative to the full sample. However, the post-1979:3 sub-sample still implies
a negative impact response of an expansionary monetary policy shock on the inﬂation rate, and
the peak response of inﬂation still occurs as late as 10 quarters after the monetary loosening.
Importantly, the deep habits model provides a good ﬁt to the observed dynamic impact of
monetary policy shocks even in the late sub-sample. We conclude from this that although the
extent of the price puzzle and the inﬂation persistence puzzle are related to structural changes,
the deep habits mechanism is key for understanding the dynamic impact of monetary policy
shocks.
5C o n c l u s i o n s
In this paper we have asked whether a parsimonious sticky-price sticky wage model extended
with deep habits can account for the dynamic eects of monetary policy shocks. We ﬁnd that
this is indeed the case. In particular, when allowing for customer market eects modeled through
deep habits, one can simultaneously account for the persistent eects of monetary policy shocks
on aggregate consumption and for the impact on inﬂation. One important aspect of our results
is that the introduction of deep habits allows one to account for the price puzzle and for inﬂation
persistence without relying on unreasonable extents of nominal rigidities. The reason for this
is that nominal rigidities in the form of impediments to price and wage adjustments and deep
habits are complementary. The existence of nominal rigidities introduces a role for deep habits in
accounting for the impact of monetary policy shocks and the countercyclical nature of markups
that derive from deep habits decreases the need for nominal rigidities when accounting for the
sluggish adjustment of inﬂation to monetary policy shocks. We have also shown that while
inﬂation persistence and the price puzzle were more pronounced pre-Volcker, the importance of
the deep habit mechanism has remained constant over time. In that sense, our paper points
towards structural reasons for the impact of monetary policy shocks on inﬂation.
Our results indicate that more attention should be directed towards goods market features
when examining the impact of monetary policy shocks. The previous literature has examined
in great detail how marginal cost persistence, backward looking price setting, and labor market
frictions impact on monetary policy, but much less attention has been paid to goods market
features which we here have shown to be key. We think that this may also have important
implications for issues relating to optimal monetary policy design but we leave this issue for
25future research.
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27Tables and Figures
Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Parameter Meaning Calibration
 Weight on distuility Calibrated to imply k =0 =3
of work
 subjective discount factor Calibrated to imply quarterly
real interest rate of 1 percent
W Steady-state gross inﬂation 1
rate
# Labor demand elasticity 4
 Inverse of labor supply 0.5
elasticity
 Inverse of intertemporal 3
elasticity of substitution
28Table 2: Estimated Parameters
Model
Deep Habits Aggregate Habit No Habit
Parameter Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
 2.48 0.27 5.18 0.03 10134 281.22
s 14.47 1.82 31.00 0.003 476040 378.33
&s 0 0.04 0 0.01 0 0.03
z 40.89 81.83 102.94 0.001 2.25 0.12
&z 0.96 1.72 0 0.01 0.14 0.01

g 0.85 0.002 - -

d -0 . 8 3 0 . 0 0 1
U 0.74 0.01 0.85 0.002 0.86 0.02
| 0.04 0.01 0.48 0.02 1 0.34
 1.26 0.02 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.08
  0.96 0.09 0.51 0.05 0.40 0.04
Value of 79.16 127.81 249.04
quadratic form
29Table 3: Estimated Parameters with Constrained Markup
Model
Deep Habits Aggregate Habit No Habit
Parameter Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
 3.19 3 3
s 10.18 0.30 24.23 0.28 33.72 135.5
&s 0 0.01 0 0.003 0 0.01
z 31.29 8.65 188.3 0.04 34.20 137.25
&z 0.99 0.25 0 0.01 0 0.01

g 0.86 0.001 - -

d -0 . 8 8 0 . 0 0 1 -
U 0.74 0.004 0.77 0.004 0.76 0.02
| 0 0.01 0 0.005 0 0.09
 1.49 0.02 1.01 0.01 1.01 0.13
  0.90 0.09 0.93 0.09 0.61 0.06
Value of 81.95 158.32 261.83
quadratic form
30Table 4: Sub-Sample Stability
Sample
1954:2-1979:2 1979:3-2008:2
Parameter Estimate Std. error Estimate Std. error
 3.91 0.84 5.76 1.42
s 6.36 4.99 10.53 14.06
&s 0.00 0.75 0.00 0.62
z 7.73 75.08 3.47 9.15
&z 1.00 0.83 0.95 1.77

g 0.89 0.003 0.90 0.003
U 0.74 0.02 0.66 0.01
| 1.00 0.12 0 0.01
 1.01 0.04 2.14 0.11
  0.74 0.07 0.93 0.09



















































Figure 1: The impact of a 1 standard error decline in the federal funds rate in the US (grey
areas represent 95 percent conﬁdence intervals)









































Figure 2: The VAR based impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the deep habits
model (lines with circles: model; full drawn line: data)









































Figure 3: The VAR based impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the aggregate habits
model









































Figure 4: The VAR based impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the model with no
habits









































Figure 5: The exact impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the deep habits model.









































Figure 6: The exact impulse responses to a monetary policy shock in the aggregate habits
model.
35Figure 7: Markup dynamics (line with circles: Deep habits; Line with crosses: Aggregate habit
model using deep habit parameter estimates; Line with boxes: Aggregate habit model with
deep habit parameters)









































Figure 8: The VAR based impact of a monetary policy shock in the deep habits economy with
a contrained markup








































Figure 9: The VAR based impact of a monetary policy shock in the deep habits economy: Post
1979:2 sample
37